The most notable idea of Charles P. Kindleberger's later career is the value of a single country acting as stabilizer of an international economy prone to instability. It runs through his widely read books,
Introduction
In the large trove of Charles P. Kindleberger's "historical economics," comprising The World in Depression, 1929 Depression, -1939 Depression, (1973 Depression, , 1986 , Manias, Crises, and Panics (1978 , 1989 , 2000 , A Financial History of Western Europe (1984 Europe ( , 1993 , and kindred contributions, the most conspicuous idea is the value of a single country acting as stabilizer of an international economy prone to instability.
2 "Hegemonic stability," the idea is called in the literature it inspired (e.g. Keohane 1986 ). This essay studies Kindleberger's attachment to the idea, which, as the epigraph shows, was more than an idea. It was an instinct honed by his personal experiences during the Second World War and its aftermath.
Kindleberger himself wrote occasionally about his wartime and early post-war experiences, including his tenure as chief of the State Department's Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs from 1945 to 1947 and adviser to the European Recovery
Program from 1947 to 1948 (Kindleberger [1968 (Kindleberger [ ] 1987 1989; 1991; [1997 ] 1999 ).
Here and there he gives a glimpse of their importance to the big idea (e.g. Kindleberger 1987, 181-184) . One set of experiences of special importance to his subsequent career was his observations on and indirect participation in the 1948 German monetary reform.
With the reform, the United States impelled Germany's conversion of old currency and other paper assets to new currency at a fraction of their former nominal value, to the end Soviet member of the ACC abandoned the council, signaling the rupture between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. The rupture suspended the work of all the ACC directorates. In its sequel in late June the Soviets blockaded Berlin. But before that, and more to the point of this essay, the rupture ended the Allied impasse over monetary reform. Like Kindleberger, only more so, Ostrander was an indirect participant in the reform.
The German monetary reform
The reform of 1948 is not a subject lacking historical attention. Besides Kindleberger and Ostrander's treatment (2003) there is Buchheim (1993) , Renger (1988) , and Sauermann (1979) , to name just a few of the scholarly works in English. The aim here is to review only the details necessary for explaining our two protagonists' perspectives on the reform in the late 1940s and then again in the late '90s.
In the aftermath of the war Germany remained beset by wartime monetary impairments. Although the Hitler government had resorted to the usual expedients of war finance, namely, explicit taxation and seigniorage, it had preferred "noiseless" methods.
It had compelled the deposit of workers' wages in savings banks that were compelled in turn to buy government debt. Insurance and social security funds had been under similar compulsion. Corporations had been ordered to use retained earnings to buy treasury bills.
At the same time, businesses had been prohibited from replacing pre-war stocks of merchandise, and any other business and consumer spending had been impeded by price controls and rationing (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 4: 13-16) . By war's end, the result was a plethora of paper and account-book claims in a prostrate country producing few goods to be claimed.
The Allies were on a precarious footing to grapple with that result. They agreed at Postdam to promote the development of local German responsibility, but the monetary problem was a national one and no national German government existed to solve it. They agreed to reconstitute Germany as a democracy, but they also agreed to impose whatever controls were necessary for a "balanced economy" and for distributing goods equitably during a moment of acute scarcity. 5 What it all implied for the Hitler price controls was unclear, but from the start of the occupation the various zone commanders decided to maintain them and in late 1945 the ACC ratified their decision (Mendershausen 1949, 647) . So, for a while at least, the controls would remain and the monetary problem would fester.
Administering the controls in the American zone fell to OMGUS (which, in late 1946, combined The consequences were manifest in the extraordinarily low physical productivity of people. Low productivity was due partly to lack of calories.
That part of it was more or less inevitable in the immediate aftermath of the war. But it was also due partly (and, over the next couple of years, increasingly) to people's calculated responses to price controls, and thus to OMGUS for maintaining the controls.
As under the Hitler government, people responded to price controls by resorting variously to black markets and to forms of barter.
The norm favored barter: most thought it better to pay the "insurance premium"
of cumbersomeness in transactions than to brazenly flout the controls (Mendershausen 1949, 651) . The main form of barter retained the use of Reichsmarks but made a trader's sacrifice of some units of "Good A" for Reichsmarks at official prices contingent on his receiving some units of "Good B" for some additional A, the ratio of the contingent transaction also being determined by official prices. One trader's sacrifice at official prices compensated the other's, so a viable trade was in effect goods-for-goods at black 5 Potsdam Agreement, 2 Aug. 1945, as excerpted in Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (1951, 6) . 6 In Kindleberger (1989, 17) . 7 In Kindleberger (1989, 35 (Stolper 1948, 102) . Logistics, however complicated, were as yet the lesser part of it. Monetary reform entailed figuring out whose claims would be honored and whose repudiated. The destruction of wealth and income wrought by the war were so vastperhaps a third of real wealth had been wiped out, and income reduced by half from the 8 An example drawn from real life: at official prices, 50 liters of gasoline cost 30 RM, as did 1 tire. But at black market prices 50 liters cost 600 RM while 1 tire cost 2,000 RM. A typical owner of a tire would not trade it for 50 liters, much less for 30 RM. But if his trade of 1 tire for 50 liters (a legal transaction) could be made contingent on another transaction whereby he gave 60 RM for an additional 100 liters (also legal), then he could be persuaded to part with it. In sum, his 1 tire plus 60 RM would get him 150 liters of gasoline. Exchanging 1 tire for 150 liters came pretty close to black market relative prices. Parting with some extra Reichsmarks was a transaction cost -and certainly not the biggest one that either trader faced (OMGUS 1947 [June n.d.] , 6). 9 Wolfgang Stolper (1948, 97) expressed the problem succinctly. Germany had become "a nation spending a large part of its life in searching for the means of survival rather than working." prewar level (Colm et al. 1946, 1) -that, when the figuring was done, the effects of monetary reform would be "tantamount to a social revolution" (Stolper 1948, 102) .
Finding consensus among either Allies or Germans on questions of revolutionary scope was unlikely. The British wanted to foster a social-democratic Germany, the French to prevent it from prospering more than France (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 13: 8-9 ).
The Soviets aimed to nationalize industry, the Americans to decartelize it (Van Hook 2004, 53-62 Germans but helped guide a decision.
The Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report recommended monetary reform in three steps (Colm et al. 1946) . (1) (Ostrander 1998, 4-5) . The practical consideration was that if, as the German price officials said, "the public and economic order" was at stake, then prudence counseled crafting a reform in which Germans would acquiesce.
By the middle of 1947, a year after the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report was finished, progress in crafting the reform had stopped. A pair of logistical questions began to rival the revolutionary ones in importance. Who would print the new currency, and where?
The Americans proposed to do the work at Germany's national printing plant, which happened to be in the American sector of Berlin, but to assuage the other Allies by putting the plant under four-power control. The Soviets first demanded control of their own set of plates, which would allow them to print the currency independently without real constraint; then, agreeing in principle to four-power control over printing, they
proposed German control over issuance and management. But no German institution of control existed, nor could it exist until the Allies resolved their broader disagreement about forms and powers of German institutions. The Americans smelled Soviet delay tactics (Bennett 1950, 43-46) . Anyway the result was deadlock.
By the fall of 1947, OMGUS authorities saw greater danger in continued delay than in a split from the Soviets and a divided Germany. The lag between ordering the currency to be printed and "C-Day," when it would be distributed, would be about 9 months. It was a long time to wait: long enough, perhaps, for the spreading economic rot to incubate communist reaction. Longer could not be allowed. Orders for the new currency were placed with U.S. printers while OMGUS set to work with renewed effort to settle the details of monetary reform with British, French, and German authorities.
OMGUS attempts to win Soviet agreement continued, but with diminishing hope and determination to go ahead in any event (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 13: 13-15; Buchheim 1993, 101 Tenenbaum knew his father's work on the Joint Boycott Council. He had used the Council's records in writing his thesis (Tenenbaum 1942, 39, fn 79) . He understood "the principle of contagion inherent in totalitarian control" (ibid., 21) and could uproot the institutions of control without remorse. For Germans especially he had scant remorse.
"Not averse as a nation to self-pity," he would later write, Germany comprised multitudes treating the misery of repressed inflation as an excuse to maintain the monetary institutions causing the repressed inflation (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 12: 13 November 20, 1947, gives evidence of his authority and his compass.
Tenenbaum dominated the meeting, emphasizing the need for cooperation, hearing the Germans' ideas, and pointing the way helpfully toward their better alignment with his own. Bureau members wanted a higher ratio of new currency exchangeable for old.
Tenenbaum, seeing the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith proposal of 10:100 as too lenient, said that 5:100 would suffice, and any more than that should be "blocked" (meaning held in account but not available for the individual's withdrawal) (Kindleberger 1997, 2-3) .
Erhard hoped that, absent a higher ratio, the Marshall Plan aid announced the previous summer might be siphoned off for consumption. Tenenbaum retorted that "the Marshall Plan does not mean help for consumer goods" (ibid., 6). Erhard worried that cancelling up to 80% of private debt such as mortgages, leaving "only" 20% valid, would amount to "unlawful enrichment" of homeowners. Tenenbaum was "perhaps ready to reduce all mortgages to 12 percent, and then finish with it" (ibid., 4). One member was anxious about the adequacy of time for exchanging currency beginning C-Day. Tenenbaum said that 24 hours were enough (ibid., 5). Tenenbaum's purport was parsimony, decisiveness, and indifference about the fine details of currency reform's distributive effects.
12
Notwithstanding their differences, on at least one point Tenenbaum did not see fit to correct the Special Bureau. Although Germans should attend to details, said Erhard, "the Allies must impose currency reform." Concurred another, "I have always felt that democracy is more tolerant than dictatorship, but with currency matters, I call for the occupation authority" (ibid., 2). The Americans sought the semblance of German participation, the Germans the assurance of Allied leadership.
The assurance was fulfilled the following spring. Aiding its fulfillment was the Plan; the plan itself stipulated European cooperation as a condition of aid, and thereby fostered European resolve in uniting and fixing Western Germany; and the prospect of a united West Germany, and moreover a united non-communist Europe, hardened Soviet resolve to prevent its realization (Behrman 2007, chs. 7, 9; Smith 1990, 462-481 Rothwesten, the solution remained in the same neighborhood. On these matters the Germans would have the opportunity to speak but not the responsibility to decide. "The monetary reform, however much it may have met the yearnings and needs of the German public," recalled Tenenbaum (ca. 1958, 13: 19) , "was in fact dictated by a Military
Government that professed to be trying to introduce democracy. It would be ridiculous to deny this."
The monetary reform that came out of Rothwesten was imposed in Western Germany beginning June 20, 1948. It substituted Deutsche Marks for Reichsmarks at 10:100, with 5 of the 10 blocked and a decision to be made about unblocking them in 90 days. The final ratio was 6.5:100. Everyone was allowed to exchange 60 marks at 1:1, paid in two installments over a month's time, but those 60 were charged against the total bought at 10:100 (Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 13: 34) . 13 Most private debts were written down 10:100. The U.S. War Department vetoed steps (2) and (3) of Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith:
collectivizing war losses and capital taxation, especially at progressive rates ranging up to practical confiscation, were measures the United States would not dictate. They would be left for Germany to decide. Reich debt would be annulled completely (Buchheim 1993, 109-111; Kindleberger and Ostrander 2003, 180-190) . Taken as a whole the reform was a good deal more parsimonious, more likely to reduce the quantity of money to a level commensurate with official prices and the growth of money to a rate commensurate with Germany's capacity to produce, than either German designs or certain French and British proposals at Rothwesten (Buchheim 1993, 107; Tenenbaum ca. 1958, 13: 33-34; ) . It was not nearly parsimonious enough for Tenenbaum. But he reckoned "it might easily have been much worse" (ibid., 33).
To Kindleberger the results were of "the nature of a miracle." In June 1948
German industrial production was 50% of the 1936 average; by February 1949 it was at 80%. In 1946 exports had been valued at $160 million; by the end of 1948 they were at $850 million annually (Kindleberger [1949 (Kindleberger [ ] 1987 
Hegemonic stability
Kindleberger's first major elaboration was in Manias, Panics, and Crashes (1978) . By extending his canvas temporally to the start of the 18 th century and geographically to Western Europe he could discuss more and varied financial crises. To Kindleberger, what the history of the Great Depression showed vividly, a larger sampling of financial crises confirmed unmistakably. Responsibility for stability was a public good. The greater were the benefits conferred by a public good, the smaller was the incentive to provide it privately. Enter the "international lender of last resort." For somebody or some nation to step forward in that role even when private incentives counseled otherwise was the function of leadership (Kindleberger 1978, 3-4, 220-226) .
But the canvas of Manias, Panics, and Crashes did not go as far as the Second 17 Myrdal answered "Yes" (Myrdal to CPK, 4 August 1970) . Both letters are in Kindleberger (1934 Kindleberger ( -1995 Part V of Financial History concentrated on the postwar period. The Marshall Plan got major billing: it allowed Kindleberger to show distinctly the difference between, on one hand, the "key-currency and key-region philosophy" that he advocated for relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and payments stability; and, on the other, the "worldwide approach" proposed by champions of the UN, World Bank, and IMF (Kindleberger 1984, 403 Germany. Still, in a minor way the story of monetary reform supported the leadership thesis. It illustrated the "political vacuum in which policy in the general interest was possible" (Kindleberger 1984, 419) . Which was to say, the general interest was served by economic policy leadership, and, as the German monetary reform showed, leadership was more likely to emerge from a political vacuum than from a bunch of contending equals.
By this time Kindleberger's leadership thesis had garnered popularity for kindred ideas in the field of international relations (e.g. Gilpin 1975; Krasner 1976 Keohane (1980, 132) dubbed it "the theory of hegemonic stability," and although Kindleberger (1986b, 289, note 1; 1986c, 841) did not care for it, the name stuck. McKeown (1983) , Lawson (1983 ), Stein (1984 , and Gowa (1984) (1973, 308) . He conceded that the latter was "the most attractive" -but, he added, "because difficult, the least likely" (ibid.). The implication was that the world would do best with the U.S. or Europe in the lead, and if the reader wondered whether it was realistic to expect Europe to take the role, then he was left with one viable option. Kindleberger did not hazard to spell it out.
The concession that leadership by international regimes was "the most attractive" option was an affirming nod to those, like Myrdal, who blanched at the thought of U.S.
hegemony. It probably made Kindleberger's thesis more palatable outside the U.S. and in circles friendly to international regimes, not least in academia. The trouble was that it encouraged inquiry along different lines than Kindleberger had in mind: not "How can a revival of U.S. leadership be fostered?" but instead "How can the option that is 'most attractive' but 'least likely' be made more likely? In what forms is it most likely?" Such were Keohane's lines of inquiry. His conclusion was that hegemony was useful for the establishment of regimes, but, when that work was done, could very well be supplanted by them. In his words, "cooperation does not necessarily require the existence of a hegemonic leader after international regimes have been established. Post-hegemonic cooperation is also possible" (Keohane 1984, 32 ).
Kindleberger's presidential address to the American Economic Association two years later offered a prominent stage for a rejoinder. "I am a realist when it comes to regimes," he said: "it seems to me that the momentum set in motion by hegemonic power ... runs down pretty quickly unless it is sustained by powerful commitment" (Kindleberger 1986a, 10) . The most fruitful course lay in persuading the nation with the power to provide international public goods to wield it, not devolve it. Anyway, hegemony was hardly as unattractive as the boosters of "post-hegemonic cooperation"
supposed.
This was the point that Kindleberger, now in his seventy-sixth year, wished to contribute to the literature that he had inspired but had gotten away from him. To support it he would need new evidence, or maybe a new take on old evidence.
Octogenarian collaboration
The spark that led to Kindleberger's reconnection with F. Taylor appointed the commission (not for having "proposed" it, as Ostrander construed him incorrectly to mean); Ostrander insisted that he and Goldsmith together cooked up the idea (Kindleberger 1984, 412; FTO to Katz, 24 May 1990, 4) . These were insignificant details in the big picture. Ostrander himself considered them personally fascinating but worth maybe "a footnote" in history books (ibid.). Nevertheless, after he settled into retirement in 1990 with a spacious basement library and a lifetime's collection of papers, he had time and means to write for whatever purpose pleased him, even footnotes. In 1992 he wrote up a friendly memo to Kindleberger to set the record straight.
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Kindleberger accepted the correction thankfully. It impelled him to change no 19 Katz had become a professor of economics at Georgetown University. The letter is in Ostrander (1945 Ostrander ( -2003 , Box "Dept. of Defense Conference," Folder "FTO Papers prepared for Dept. of Defense Conference." 20 "F. Taylor Ostrander -Experience in Post-War Germany," typescript, 10 March 1992. Receipt acknowledged by Kindleberger in CPK to FTO, 14 March 1992 (in Ostrander [1945 , Box "Dept. of Defense Conference," Folder "FTO Papers prepared for Dept. of Defense Conference"). replacing the Ruble, they would disintegrate economically. Timing of currency reform was important, as a competent administration would be needed to pull it off, and any administration would have to be assembled from the wreckage of the old. And fashioning a Soviet currency reform that was at once democratic and effective would require "super-human efforts" (Ostrander 1992a, 2) . 26 The problem with the answers was just what Ostrander had sensed two years before. Maybe they were right, but they did not
give much practical advice for monetary reforms in new times and different lands (1992a, 1; 1992b, 1, 3, 5) . Isaiah Frank, William Harris, and David Epstein. 26 See also Ostrander (1992b) , which is consistent with but expands upon the quoted document. I do not know which represents more faithfully the remarks that Ostrander presented at the conference. He appears to have typed both from notes and memory a short while after his return (FTO to Katz, 1992 n.d. [ca. late March] , in Ostrander [1945 Ostrander [ -2003 , op. cit.).
world's benefit as well as its own. Also that, in order to exercise responsibility effectively, "our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential 1993, [8] [9] . It was leaked to the New York Times and referenced in a front-page story shortly before the conference (Tyler 1992) . But this author has seen no record of its making any impression on Kindleberger and Ostrander.
The nascent reconsideration of the German monetary reform lay dormant for five more years. Then Kindleberger revived it in vexation. In 1997, Amity Shlaes published a story in The New Yorker celebrating the success of the Deutschemark and asking, "Can the Euro take its place?" It depends, was her answer. What miffed Kindleberger was not her answer but the historical sketch behind it. Shlaes said that the "priest" of the German economic miracle, which was initiated by the monetary reform, was Ludwig Erhard (Shlaes 1997, 188 Kindleberger's finest introduction, and it would remain a mess even in the final product.
But there would be some signal changes along the way.
A few days after finishing the first draft Kindleberger received a much-awaited delivery. Earlier in July he had read an article by Eckhard Wandel (1979) Tenenbaum felt no compunction about using "force" to see American views prevail, for monetary reforms were "by their very nature citatorial and conspiratorial." In order to avoid a wave of speculation the public had to be kept in the dark. Parliamentary deliberation was out of the question. But, what was more, why give Germans much of a say even in secretive deliberations out of the public eye? "We seriously doubted the wisdom of saddling the weak German government with the enormous responsibility and onus of currency reform." Deliberating with the other Western allies was more necessary, but even so, the United States was the preeminent power among them and had the responsibility to use that power for "reestablishing law and order in the economic field," for "liquidating economic dictatorship." Any democratic state could rightfully use "emergency police powers" to those ends. It went without saying that the U.S. Military Government could, too (ibid., 13: 17-19 it had changed the project. To Kindleberger, it was "sad for the social sciences" that democracy was not always fit for the economic tasks at hand, but so it went, and the social scientists had to face the fact. Leadership was necessary, as he had observed all along. Doyens of the academic field of international relations could not skirt around the fact by fostering deliberative "regimes" to provide leadership without hegemony.
Deliberation was unreliable. The fact remained. It had to acknowledged forthrightlyeven when the alternative to deliberation was "despotism."
Ostrander, however, was not among the initiates. He was puzzled by the sudden appearance and insistent repetition of "despot" and its variants. Ostrander averred, "'despot' seems an inappropriate word in this context" (ibid., emphasis in the original).
To this Kindleberger responded with his own softish despotism. Ostrander had asked about purpose, Kindleberger acknowledged a few days later. "Here is where we may have different ideas that must be resolved for the collaboration to work," he replied.
The second draft, he said pointedly, stated the purposes clearly: to disabuse scholars about Erhard's role, to say something about the origins of the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith report, and, above all, to ask and answer a series of questions about currency reform.
Then going from pointed to cutting: "These are scholarly interests. I pretend to be a scholar. ... Your interest Taylor, it seems to me is to educate a wider public, those who read for example, the NYTimes M[a]gazine Section, The Atlantic, or Harpers" (CPK to FTO, 15 Sept. 1997 ).
Kindleberger opportunely avoided the "despotism" question and thereby missed the point. He did not answer the question, did not even admit it. Nor did he need to, as scholarship was ostensibly his province not Ostrander's. "Despot" would stay, whether
Ostrander liked it not.
The word stayed because it served the deeper purpose that the collaboration had taken on. The purpose did not relate particularly to Erhard or Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith or even monetary reform -although it did relate, as Kindleberger said, to "scholarly interests." It was to turn the scholarly conversation away from post-hegemonic cooperation and toward the restoration of leadership, as Kindleberger understood it.
Conclusion
After beginning their work but before wrapping it up, Kindleberger and Ostrander found its outlet (CPK to FTO, 7 October 1997) . 35 They presented it at a conference on "The 
